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Abstract 
The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century’s 
financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE).  The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry 
was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is 
also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which 
argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in 
economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was 
able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. 
We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the 
official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct 
operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, 
and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent 
theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and 
investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. 
We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet 
thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series 
which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, 
transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the 
Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that market, which should be 
compared with other markets on similar concrete grounds. 
 
Résumé 
L’histoire financière explique souvent le succès de Londres comme marché financier dominant au 19e 
siècle par les microstructures efficaces de la Bourse de Londres (LSE). Le LSE se caractérise en particulier par 
une faible régulation, l’entrée libre des opérateurs, ce qui permettrait de réduire les coûts de transaction, 
d’accroître la liquidité et la diversification, attirant à la fois émetteurs et investisseurs. Nous montrons que les 
microstructures londoniennes ne sont pas nécessairement optimales et montre que des microstructures très 
différentes ont permis le succès de la Bourse de Paris, loin de l’idée reçue selon laquelle cette place aurait été 
victime d’un interventionnisme inefficace ou d’un monopole hostile à toute innovation. Nous étudions en détail 
l’organisation du Parquet parisien et ses complémentarités avec la Coulisse, le marché libre et les opérations des 
banques. Nous montrons qu’une telle organisation multi-polaire était efficace car elle permettait une 
spécialisation des agents (aussi bien intermédiaires qu’émetteurs et investisseurs) et des complémentarités qui 
permettaient au marché de joindre développement et stabilité. Grâce à l’usage des archives de la Bourse de Paris, 
nous pouvons construire des données sur les volumes échangés, les prix des charges, les coûts de transaction et 
les risques qui permettront à ce débat de prendre un tour plus empirique que jusqu’à présent. 
 
JEL : G14, G18, G24, G28, N 13, N23, N43 
Keywords: Paris Stock exchange, microstructure, monopoly, regulation 
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A large body of recent literature argues that financial markets microstructures are key to 
understand their relative success, which itself is important for economic growth (Coffee, 
2001; Pagano & Roell, 1990, 1996 ; Madhavan, Porter & Weaver, 2005; Rousseau, 2003; 
Rousseau & Sylla, 2001; Neal, 1990; Levine, 1991, 1998; Beck, Levine & Loayza, 1999);  . 
Since in the first era of globalisation, financial market development was similar to today 
(Rajan & Zingales, etc), it is tempting to study that hypothesis in retrospect. Recent research 
has improved our understanding of these issues (e.g. Davis & Neal, 2005, 2006; Michie, 
1987, 1988; White, 2003, 2004, 2006; Riva, 2005, 2007; Baia Curioni, 1995), building on a 
stream of literature from the 19th c. itself (Boissière, 1908, Boudon, 1898; Gilson, 1889; 
Robert-Milles, 1912; Neymarck 1884, Les grands marchés financiers, 1912; Vidal, 1904, 
1910). One important reason to do so is that London, New-York and Paris, the three major 
stock markets in the late 19th century, had very different organizations. If the London and 
New-York stock exchanges have been studied in much detail, research on the Paris Bourse 
has concentrated up to now on market capitalization and stock issues (Hautcoeur 1994), or 
new indices (Arbulu, 1998; Vaslin; Reazae). Comments on its organization are usually quite 
superficial, using old references more than primary sources, inspired by late 19th century 
                                                 
a Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris School of Economics, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris; 
www.pse.ens.fr/hautcoeur. 
b DEAS (University of Milano) and IDHE (joint research unit CNRS-ENS Cachan-Universities of Paris I, VIII 
and X). 
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polemics on the monopoly of the official brokers or agents de change1; they also suffer 
anachronism and some whig bias (Hannah, 2007), supposing implicitly that the only possible 
efficient organization is the London one. They don’t discuss the paradox of an inefficient 
monopoly building in a few decades the second most important stock exchange in the world, 
in a country widely considered as less modern than the German or the US ones. They also 
forget a recent literature on financial markets organization which is less generally favourable 
to the London organization. In this paper, we try to integrate various different theoretical 
arguments on the organization of stock exchanges into a broader and more historical 
explanation of the development of the Paris market. We use detailed archival records of the 
Compagnie des agents de change (CAC) in order to understand both the various episodes of 
microstructure transformation and to construct the new statistics that allow a measure of the 
impact of these changes (Lagneau & Riva, 2007). 
In a first part, we present recent theoretical developments which show that other organizations 
than the London one can be efficient; in particular, we discuss the possible efficiency of a 
multipolar organization, in which various organized exchanges co-exist and complement each 
other in the same financial centre. In the second part, we present the history of the Paris 
Bourse as a competitive multi-polar organization. In the third part, we try to provide some 
new measures allowing a quantitative evaluation of that organization’s success, focusing on 
transaction costs, the security of transactions and the growth of transactions. Unfortunately, 
these data are only available for the official exchange. Nevertheless, since that exchange is 
usually considered by the critics of the Paris organization as the least efficient of the Paris 
markets, we can consider that they provide an upper bound of their costs. 
 
I. Theory 
 
Much of the literature on the Paris market explains the coexistence of the official market (the 
Parquet) and the unofficial market (the Coulisse) only by the legal monopoly of the former, 
which allowed him to survive in spite of the superior efficiency of the Coulisse. This literature 
is based on a simple model of the optimal organization of a financial exchange, and neglects 
that the coexistence of various exchanges in the same financial centre may enhance its 
efficiency. The former coexistence of various markets in New-York or the contemporary one 
                                                 
1 A recent paper by E. White (2006) goes one step beyond by integrating statistical data to a theory of the 
microstructures of the Parisian market in the late 19th century, dealing with the 1882 krach. We will argue below 
that it did not go in sufficiently detail in the organization of the market.  
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of the NYSE and the Nasdaq or of two derivative markets in Chicago suggests just that. 
Economic theory also provides arguments in that direction.  
Traditional theory only focuses on the gains from competition among brokers in a unique 
exchange organization, on the model of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). More recent 
theory emphasizes two levels of competition: one among brokers in an exchange, and one 
among exchanges in a financial centre. Regulation of these markets can go from centralized 
(under the government’s authority), to decentralized, the government only validating “internal 
regulatory models” as in the recent Basle agreements, with many intermediary solutions.  
An organization with a unique exchange maximizes economies of scale and scope, and 
externalities in liquidity, fixed costs are amortized on more transactions, leading to lower 
transactions costs, better prices and more incentives for firms to list their shares. These 
increasing returns suggest that a single exchange is the natural an optimal outcome of 
competition (Arthur, 1989; Economides, 1995; Pagano, 1989, 1993; Hagel & Armstrong, 
1997; Stigler, 1961; Demsetz, 1968; Telser, 1981; Glosten, 1994; Di Noia, 2001). 
Nevertheless, a single exchange faces a dilemma that the literature has emphasized: if its 
organization is very decentralized (as the LSE), maximizing competition among brokers who 
realize a constant flow of operations using the services of market makers (jobbers in London), 
the prices remain essentially private and quite opaque (at least before computers); on the other 
hand, if it is more centralized, all participants bring the securities they want to sell or buy to a 
single confrontation or fixing, leading to a very representative and transparent price (so the 
preference of Walras for this organization). A decentralized market is likely to be efficient for 
largely traded securities, and is preferred by important investors who don’t suffer the results 
of insider trading or information asymmetries and can negotiate low transaction costs with the 
brokers; for the less liquid securities, it can lead to heavy inequalities among participants and 
important spreads. A centralized market protects small investors but inefficiently restricts 
useful operations on major securities. In order to work as it intends, it must restrict the entry 
of brokers and impose them stricter rules of behaviour, which precisely make it an integrated 
(the term of the art in neo-institutional economics), more like hierarchical organization, like a 
firm. 
These two solutions (market vs hierarchy) for the organization of a stock exchange permit 
understanding why the difference between a financial centre and a stock exchange is not 
always clear. If a stock exchange is decentralized and very similar to a pure market with free 
entry, the very looseness of its organization makes it difficult to organize a competitor: all 
brokers are incited to participate that organization, which maximizes liquidity and network 
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externalities. On the other hand, a centralized stock exchange leads easily to the emergence of 
competitors, coordinating those brokers who have not been admitted to the exchange (see 
table 1 for all possible structures).  
Possible financial centres as concerns secondary markets 
 Strong organisation Loose organisation 
Single exchange Impossible London 
Various exchanges Paris, New-York Diluted market : OTC 
 
Such a financial centre where various exchanges compete can appear as inefficient from the 
point of view of economies of scale and liquidity maximization. Nevertheless, it can also have 
some advantages, which must be balanced with these costs (Schwartz 89, 95; Parlour & 
Foucault, 1999; Gehrig, 2000; Coffee, 2001; Allen & Gale, 2000). First, the competition 
among exchanges can lead to more innovations at the exchange-management level (settlement 
or payment organizations, etc). Second, various exchanges can also be complementary. The 
competitors of the most centralized exchange may have a more decentralized organization, 
and deal more efficiently with those categories of securities and investors the centralized 
exchange favours less. This does not impede these organizations to compete at the margin. 
In such a model, various financial centre structures can be efficient, each one having its main 
advantages, and their comparison is an empirical open question, which must focus on 
measures of the various services of a stock exchange: price quality, liquidity, transactions’ 
security, stability, adaptability to shocks or innovations.  
 
We propose to analyze the Paris Parquet using such a model. This suggests considering the 
Parquet as only one (important) element in the Paris securities market, and understanding the 
behaviour of the Compagnie des agents de change (CAC) (the corporation or “guild” of stock 
brokers which sets up the Parquet) in a broader framework than the monopoly-competition 
one. In such a framework in particular, a complete monopoly is not only inefficient but 
impossible; actually, monopoly provisions are only one – likely changing – element shaping 
the structure of the financial centre. One advantage is explaining the existence of some degree 
of monopoly without the unsatisfactory hypothesis that a (captured) government imposes for 
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long periods an inefficient organization, which contradicts with an otherwise open economy 
and the succession of very different governments (and even political regimes)2.  
 
II. Major changes in the organization of the Paris official stock exchange  
 
The usual description of the Paris stock market considers it as the conflict between a 
monopoly granted by the State to the conservative CAC and an “underground” free market, 
the Coulisse. Actually, this dual structure is not stable at all, since the structure of the Parquet 
(much better known than that of the Coulisse) evolved with time, and relationships between 
the Parquet and the Coulisse were as much of cooperation and complementarity as of 
competition. We focus here on the main changes affecting the organization of the Parquet and 
their effect on the services it provided to firms and investors. We mention three categories of 
organisational changes: those concerning the way operations were handled (pricing 
techniques, negotiation groups, settlement and payment, price list publication); those affecting 
the guarantees operators benefited; and those related to the relations (cooperation, 
competition) among exchanges (Parquet vs Coulisse). These categories are not independent: if 
the birth of the Parquet resulted very much from a legal monopoly imposing some obligations 
concerning pricing methods or price publications; and its development as a small 
homogeneous and closed group was a consequence of both the collective guarantees it 
developed and the quality of the pricing it provided. This justifies a chronological exposition 
of its history. 
 
1. 1801-1832 
From the reopening of the Bourse in 1801 to 1832, most of the markets activity concentrated 
on the State rentes, the public debt consolidated in 1797 in a single 5% perpetual fund after 
the “two thirds default”. The First Consul and later Emperor did not appreciate the 
government policy to be quoted in a market, and he took advantage of the first crisis (1805) to 
change the spirit of the market as it had been established (and considered in the first version 
of the Code de commerce), and tried to control it by re-establishing the monopoly of the 
agents de change, creating a Compagnie des agents de change (CAC) under government 
supervision, and having the government nominating all new agents (he also intervened in the 
markets through the network of Treasury agents and the Bank of France) (Locré, 1827). From 
                                                 
2 One can even not exclude in our framework the possibility that an exchange appearing only for rent-seeking 
purpose under privileged status becomes part of an efficient market structure.. 
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its start, the market maintained the French tradition of the “cri”, by which the market for the 
leading securities – and especially the rentes – was centralized and public, guaranteeing the 
price sincerity and then the security of the public, and probably also facilitating the 
government’s control. 
Although it appears to have been under quite authoritarian rule, the market didn’t suffer 
much. The monopoly wasn’t respected. The CAC had no actual control on the agents. Partly 
because of political uncertainty and partly because of a lack of organization, the market 
fluctuated heavily. At a first stage, the difference between official agents de change and 
outside brokers (later called coulissiers) was limited and both groups cooperated daily, in 
particular because no transfer of rentes (which were all nominative securities) was possible 
without the intermediation of the agents in spite of much the forward market being among 
non-agents de change. The Parquet’s end of month settlement, created in 1805, served then 
for the entire market. Second because the high turnover among the agents de change made 
them appear as risky as the coulissiers: from 1801 to 1814, 115 agents were nominated, 
among whom 65 left the profession before 1815, 46 because of bankruptcy3. 
 
The invasion of France in 1815, the Restauration and mostly the war indemnity required by 
the Allies imposed a change: contrary to previous governments, the new one had to issue a 
huge amount of debt on the market (around 25% of GDP) in order to make the foreign troups 
leave. Guaranteeing a free and secure market to new investors became a priority. The 
development of the liquidity of the market was a second objective.  
The priority given to security led first to maintain the centralized and public quotation 
process. The role of the opening fixing was to provide a guarantee to small investors: it was 
an investment in reputation, not so much towards investors than towards the general public 
and the political sphere. But in order to allow for the increase in liquidity, the fixing could be 
followed in the same day by a number of prices, which allowed for intra-day speculation by 
market makers. Nevertheless, the main characteristic of a centralized price-setting mechanism 
was never modified.  
Four solutions were discussed in order to reinforce the security of transactions and the 
stability of the market: restrictions to securities listing; restrictions to the entry of new agents 
de change; better selection of the agents; mutual guarantee among them.  
                                                 
3 PVCSPARIS, 20/6/1814 
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The problem with restricting the listing of securities was that it was contradictory with the 
monopoly of the agents. It was also almost impossible to impose. In practice, it was to lead to 
the development of a “second class” market: the Coulisse. But during that first period, such a 
division was not yet accepted, and the development of trade on foreign (mostly Napolitan and 
Spanish) government bonds led the government in 1824 to accept their listing on the official 
market (under government authorization) after years of cooperation between coulissiers and 
agents.  
The numerus clausus of agents de change had been suppressed in 1791. Under the first years 
of the re-established monopoly, the number of agents increased without clear limit. The 
numerus clausus was imposed in 1816 only, because of the number of failures in the previous 
years, under the argument that mutual knowledge and control was a condition for solvability 
control and risky behaviours’ limitation4. In 1816, the number fixed (60) was considered too 
high for the agents to make a decent living on their trade, and some charges remained vacant. 
The strict selection of candidates to the position of agent de change was considered as 
necessary to limit moral hazard problems in a group which reputation depended on the 
behaviour of all its members. It was first organized by the government (helped in principle by 
the Chamber of commerce). The failure of that solution was recognized in 1816 because of 
the high rate of bankruptcies during the Empire. The selection was transferred to each 
individual agent in 1816 when the property of their charges was guaranteed, but after a 
conflict between the Finance Minister Corvetto and the Chambre syndicale (the governing 
body of the CAC), the selection was transferred in 1818 to the Chambre syndicale, even if 
each agent could still propose candidates for his own charge. The selection bettered from 
then, but remained restricted to the entry of new agents, little control during their activity 
being possible yet. Nevertheless, a mutual social control was to develop all over the century 
(e.g. AG CAC 29/11/ 1841 mentions that the Chambre syndicale must watch over the private 
life of the agents).  
The 1818 change was crucial since it transferred crucial powers to the CAC and especially to 
the Chambre syndicale, with the responsibility of conciliating liquidity and security. The 
Comité (the body preceding the Chambre syndicale) had been requiring for years without 
success more power on selection, definition of the internal rules of the Bourse, police of the 
                                                 
4  It has been argued frequently that the numerus clausus and the property-rights of the agents on their offices 
had been created for budgetary reasons, but the offices were never sold out, and the cautionnement – the 
guarantee deposited at the Treasury – was only fixed in 1818 (décret of  January 9, 1818).  
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operations5, as well as confirmation of the monopoly and the property rights of agents on their 
offices. They obtained these guarantees and powers in 1816 by convincing the government 
that the market self-regulation would be more efficient and create more confidence that an 
external regulation6.  
The principle of mutual guarantee was discussed very early as a solution to the 
interdependence of the risks supported by the agents and as supporting the reputation of the 
market as a whole. It was rejected by most agents during that period on moral hazards 
grounds (see e.g. discussions at the CAC meeting in 1817 on the Pillot bankruptcy). In 1818, 
when a grave crisis provoked three bankruptcies among the agents and serious problems for 
many of their colleagues-creditors, the CAC – which promised to pay the main bankrupt’s 
clients and helped the others – obtained a 5 millions loan from the Bank of France under a 
joint guarantee of all the agents7. This crisis proved important since this was the first case of 
collective guarantee (even if a short term one), and because a Caisse d’amortissement 
(sinking fund) was created in order to reimburse the amounts advanced to the colleagues in 
crisis; that fund was financed thanks to the payment of a timbre (a stamp duty) on the 
operations of all agents. In 1822, this fund became permanent under the name Fonds commun; 
it received the product of a timbre of 10% of brokerage commissions up to a total of three 
millions francs (above which it paid a proportional dividend to all the agents). This Fonds 
provided for the expenses of the Chambre syndicale, and managing the systemic risk by 
providing loans to agents suffering short term liquidity problems. If this was a change towards 
a more collective and hierarchical behaviour of the CAC, it still took a while before the 
change became substantial : during the 1823 crisis, three agents filed for bankruptcy without 
receiving any help, since the CAC was not in danger and it considered their behaviour had 
been excessively risky. The Fonds was used for the first time during the 1830-31 crisis, as we 
will discuss below. 
During that first period, the Chambre syndicale was then not able to organize the CAC in 
order to take advantage of the monopoly or to increase the security of the transactions. 
Actually, the agents continued cooperating with the coulissiers, made illegal operations 
(either operating for themselves or on the forward market), and even contested some decisions 
                                                 
5 That police was under the control of the Interior Ministry, something that led the agents to fear interventions 
based on public order considerations.  
6 A proof of that efficiency was the exclusion by the CAC of an agent (Dufresne) in december 1815, and its 
success at limiting the propagation of the crisis. The new powers of the Chambre syndicale would be exerted 
against agent Pillot on May 7, 1817.  
7  It also obtained a loan from the Treasury, without giving any collective guarantee, and the promise by a group 
of bankers to buy rentes on the market, then limiting the bear pressures, on the promise that no other agent 
would go bankrupt.  
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of the Chambre syndicale in court. The Chambre syndicale was also unable to lobby 
efficiently the government in order to maximize monopoly profits: for example it could not 
impede the decision by the Royal Court of Paris in 1823, in a solemn audience presided by the 
Justice Minister, to reject the previous years’ jurisprudence by the commercial courts that 
considered forward operations as legal and then imposed the investors to pay their debts in 
case of losses. The Court confirmed the “exception de jeu” which allowed a debtor not to pay 
if it invoked the fact he had been incited to “gamble”, creating an enormous uncertainty in the 
forward market. Another jurisprudence disfavouring the agents was the rejection by 
commercial courts to consider the Fonds commun as pertaining to the CAC: when an agent 
failed, his share in the Fonds was considered by the courts as part of his assets, when at the 
same time the court refused to incorporate his debts vis-à-vis other agents in his liabilities (see 
e.g. the Cléret bankruptcy in 1824). It then suggests that no solidarity among agents was 
recognized. 
 
2. 1830-1860 
Major institutional changes around 1830 justify considering the markets entered a new era. 
They affected both the categories of negotiable securities, the validity of forward operations 
and the guarantees provided to investor. Thanks to these changes, the stock exchange was 
able to facilitate the expansion of manufacturing and especially the transport revolution, most 
notably by playing a major role in railroads, which alone mobilized investments of around 2% 
of GDP every year from the 1840s to the 1860s.  
The period was first characterized by a sharp increase in the types and number of securities 
traded. This resulted not only from the railroad revolution, but also from the 1832 judiciary 
confirmation of the tradability of shares in sociétés en commandites par actions (the typical 
manufacturing firms’ organization, see Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, 2004) and from the 
development of foreign issues on the Paris market. 
This led to an increase in the heterogeneity among the securities traded (from small firms’ 
shares to the rente), which made inefficient a single market organization. Although the 
monopoly remained in the law, in practice the Coulisse developed as a separate market, and 
the Parquet renounced to quote some securities, concentrating instead in reinforcing its own 
organization. It had actually enough with the major new issues of the period, among which 
railroads and new joint-stock banks were the most important, not to ask for the enforcement 
of its monopoly. The Coulisse focused instead on shares in smaller firms (which the Parquet 
abandoned after the 1837 krach on the commandites), in the 1840s on promesses d’actions 
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(provisory shares of not-yet-authorized corporations, mostly railroads), and in the 1850s on 
foreign private issues; it also competed with the Parquet on the rentes market, especially after 
the creation of bearer rentes certificates in 1831.  
 
The second important change on the eve of the period was the quasi-legalization of the 
forward market. In 1832, civilian courts made forward contracts enforcable by recognizing 
their validity even without previous money deposit by forward buyers (bear speculation did 
not get the same approval !). The publication in 1832 of the internal rules of the CAC 
reinforced that decision by providing a collective guarantee of the CAC to forward operations. 
The fact the Finance Ministry refused to approve these rules made it compulsory for the 
agents de change but not for their clients, so that only the courts new jurisprudence protected 
them, sometimes imperfectly8. Forward operations became increasingly important, not only 
for the rentes, but mostly now for new issues of railroads shares and bonds. This justified 
their publication on the official listing from 1844.  A last jurisprudential move in 1848 
reinforced the agents de change’ protection by distinguishing “serious” from “fictitious” 
forward operations (a distinction originating from the CAC own rules): serious operations 
were those by regular forward market operators; they could not ask for “exception de jeu”. 
From then, the Parquet was able to develop forward markets without important restriction or 
loss of reputation. 
 
The third major transformation at the beginning of the 1830s was the development of the 
collective guarantee of the CAC during the 1830-31 crisis. In that episode, the Fonds commun 
was used for the first time under the sole authority of the Chambre syndicale in order to save 
several agents from bankruptcy. From that date, the Chambre syndicale was allowed to use 
part of the Fonds commun (an amount equal to the quote of the agent in the Fonds – 50.000 
and later 100.000 francs – the cautionnement plus 100.000 francs, all guaranteed by the office 
value) without asking the general meeting of the CAC, and the decisions of the general 
meeting on more substantial helps changed from almost unanimity to a 2/3d majority rule, 
both representing a much more structured and hierarchical organization. This position was 
strengthened in 1835 when the Paris court recognized to the Fonds commun the status of a 
                                                 
8 Actually, some courts decision still came against the agents, by recognizing the « exception de jeu » in spite of 
the new jurisprudence. They were increasingly rare. In 1842, an agent was penally sentenced for forward 
operations, provoking a strong protest from the CAC, which the Finance Minister approved ; this paved the way 
to the 1844 quasi officialization.  
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civil society, giving priority to the claims of the CAC members on those of other creditors, 
and then allowing the Chambre syndicale to use it to deal with crises. 
Later on, other efforts aimed at reinforcing the security of operations for investors. They were 
also exclusively undertaken by the Parquet and not by the Coulisse (although it was maybe 
only because the official position of the agents de change made it important for them to 
appear as prudent intermediaries to the government), and focused on limiting excessive risk-
taking during bull periods9. Above this, a regular inspection of all the agents accounting 
books was started in 1846, and the Fonds commun was doubled to 6 millions in 1852, also 
improving transaction security. These efforts didn’t suppress bull or bear markets, but they 
reinforced the legitimacy and reputation of the Parquet. Especially important was the fact that, 
thanks to the Fonds commun and the hierarchical organization under the Chambre syndicale, 
and in spite of a number of crises, only one agent de change filed for bankruptcy from 1831 to 
1859, and losses for the general public were very limited10.  
 
Taken jointly, these three changes led the way to the development of the Parquet and its 
separation from the Coulisse. A last change was more progressive, less visible, but played a 
major role in the separation and later competition between the Parquet and the Coulisse : the 
more efficient organization of settlements and payments. As soon as 1836, the Chambre 
syndicale organized a centralized settlement of the spot operations, with the help of the Bank 
of France for the payments. This mechanism was limited because the courts required the 
agents to be always able to follow every debtor during all the transaction process, impeding 
multilateral compensation. It was extended to most operations and reinforced in 1843 and 
1845, when a true compensation of all debts among the participants was put in place. This 
was allowed by the greater legitimacy of forward operations which had appeared on the Cote 
officielle in 1844. Multilateral compensation also required mutual confidence. As early as 
1828, the Chambre syndicale had tried to limit the then limited compensations to reliable 
brokers, and established lists of bad payers. The increase in collective guarantee among the 
                                                 
9 In the 1830s, 42 agents asked for increased guarantees in the Caisse commune for forward operations on the 
Spanish rente, the main speculative security on the market. The Chambre syndicale asked for similar protections 
during the the canals and the sociétés en commandites shares’ bubbles in the same years, signalling its efforts to 
the government. In 1844, the Chambre syndicale excluded promesses d’actions from the market, and switched 
from a monthly to a bi-monthly settlement in order to decrease the risks from forward operations at each 
settlement date. In 1851-52, it cooperated with the Bank of France against the bull market and imposed to the 
agents de change a guarantee deposit of 150 francs by share (around one third of their price) for forward 
operations.  
10  Nevertheless, debates at the CAC general meeting on that bankrtupcy show that there was still no unanimity 
within the CAC on collective guarantee,  
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agents de change in 1830 led to the restriction to that group of the mutual confidence, and 
then of the compensation11. In the 1860s, the CAC considered its settlement mechanism as 
much superior both in terms of rapidity, security and cost to that existing in London, and as a 
direct result of the entry restriction it enforced. 
 
The Parquet’s strategy was then to provide low-cost efficient operating mechanisms and very 
secure operations in order to attract investors (especially risk-averse ones), and to abandon to 
the Coulisse the high-risk, high-return end of the market. The resulting specialization between 
Parquet and Coulisse was accepted by both up to the end of the 1850s, and the markets 
appeared mostly complementary. Nevertheless, from the very beginning, the Parquet 
considered the relationship as a hierarchical one, since it could choose the securities it listed, 
and the Coulisse mostly had to adapt. For sure, at the start of the period the agents de change 
also operated on unlisted securities in cooperation with coulissiers, as well as the opposite (cf 
PV CS 6/12/1841). Increasingly yet, they tried to enforce their monopoly on operations on 
listed securities, and to enlarge the list. In 1844, the Parquet created a second list (the rez de 
chaussée, or ground floor of the official list) in order to affirm its right to quote more risky 
shares. In 1858, they obtain the right to list foreign private securities, the last type of securities 
that was de facto reserved to the Coulisse up to then. All these moves were motivated by the 
high efficiency and the dynamic strategies of the Parquet. But they inefficiently led to an 
attempt at absorbing the Coulisse. 
 
3. 1859-1882 
In the 1850s, the cooperation-competition between the Parquet and the Coulisse was 
increasingly conflictive. The Parquet’s first attempts at imposing its monopoly in courts did 
not succeed, though in some cases a few coulissiers were condemned in order to calm 
speculative behaviours (like in 1856). In 1859 by contrast, the Parquet obtained a very severe 
sentence against all the major and most reputable brokers of the Coulisse, and used it in order 
to absorb the Coulisse.  
The Parquet modified its own organization for that purpose: new quotation groups were 
created, new securities were listed (especially foreign private ones), minimum commissions 
were decreased, new operations were introduced that existed previously only on the Coulisse 
(low price options in particular), the monthly settlement was reintroduced (as in the Coulisse 
                                                 
11 The solidarity was further boosted when the Chambre syndicale obtained the right to decide at which price the 
charges were to be sold. 
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tradition). Most importantly, new jobs as “main clerks” (commis principaux) were created for 
former coulissier, with substantial autonomy within the agents de change offices.  
Four main reasons explain the failure of the absorption. 
First, the new commis did not adapt. They kept making their own operations outside the stock 
exchange, and took risks the agents de change did not want to consider as theirs. They 
refused the proposal of the Chambre syndicale, which wanted to impose to CAC members to 
hire them under a fixed wage in order to impede the increasing competition among agents that 
would result from having them as quasi-subsidiary, negotiating commissions and taking risks 
and then free riding first on the charges they were supposed to pertain, second on the CAC as 
a whole. The conflicts that appeared within the CAC led to the re-establishment of many of 
these commis as independent brokers, without any formal organization at first, later with a 
very loose one allowing for operations to be done and settled (a history actually badly known 
up to now).  
Second, the creation of a tax on foreign securities circulating in France helped to resurrect the 
Coulisse, which accepted to list and quote even securities which issuers did not pay for it. 
Although the State in this case probably wanted to enforce the monopoly since he was sure 
that the agents de change would not take the risk of listing securities violating the law, it was 
in fact unable to do it. Many securities with limited French circulation were listed on the 
Coulisse (see e.g. AG CAC, 21/12/1863; 9/5/1870).   
Third reason for the Coulisse renaissance:  the 1870s provided special opportunities to the 
marché libre. After the war with Prussia was lost, the government had to issue new rentes for 
the enormous amount of 5 billions francs within a short period. Even if they did their best, the 
agents de change and the official networks of Treasury agents in the provinces were not able 
to facilitate the distribution of enormous quantities of bonds towards investors. The Crédit 
mobilier, which had played a great role under the Empire, had failed in 1867 and had not yet 
been replaced. A speculative forward market on the rentes developed outside the Bourse, 
which “help” (since speculation remained bullish almost constantly and the price of the rentes 
increased from 1872 to 1879) the government greatly appreciated.  
Last reason for the re-establishment of a Coulisse: the development of the newly created joint-
stock banks (Comptoir d’escompte de Paris in 1848, Crédit Lyonnais in 1863, Société 
générale in 1865), which rapidly searched for diminishing their dependence towards the 
Parquet for their and their clients’ securities operations. The Crédit Lyonnais hosted the 
Coulisse brokers in its main building for years. These banks participated heavily in the 
distribution of the post-war loans. In the early 1870s, the CAC feared that some banks might 
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try to buy an agent de change office which would have allowed them to legalize their own 
operations (PV CAC 21/12/1872). 
The most dynamic segment of the market then developed outside the Parquet in the late 1860s 
and 1870s. In particular, most of the numerous new companies in the financial sectors 
(insurance, banks, finance companies), were not listed on the Parquet.  
 
Our conclusion is that the very success of the Parquet led him to adopt an erroneous 
monopolistic strategy: in trying to absorb the Coulisse without adapting its rules to the 
specificities of the Coulisse’s operations, it created a hole in the provision of financial 
services. The Coulisse provided different services to a class of important investors and 
speculators which could not accept the Parquet’s strict rules. When an exogenous shock 
increased the importance of these actors, the Parquet’s attempt at controlling all the financial 
market was deemed to fail. This attempts’ failure then confirms the importance of multi-polar 
organizations and the impossibility of a single market if it is centralized. It also confirms that 
the reason for the existence of the Coulisse was no the inefficiency of the Parquet, but the fact 
it imposed strict rules and regulations that did not satisfy all the actors involved.  
 
4. 1882-1914 
The 1882 “Union générale” krach was another shock that determined the long term evolution 
of the market. The krach mostly affected the financial industry which had been developing 
frenetically during the previous years, presenting all the characteristics of a financial bubble. 
The Union générale, the most recent of the big joint-stock banks failed in the middle of the 
krach, mostly because of buying back its own shares on the forward market. The krach deeply 
affected the Lyon stock exchange, where 14 agents de change filed for bankruptcy. In Paris, 
the crisis was also serious, since 6 agents had to resign and 8 others suffered enough to ask for 
the help of the CAC. More importantly, the Parquet had to borrow in order to face the January 
settlement. The Bank of France and a consortium of banks lent it 80 millions francs without 
which the whole market could have failed. 
In a recent paper, E. White considers this loan as a proof of the incapacity of the Parquet to 
provide the security it promised. Since its superior security was a major argument in favour of 
the centralized organization of the Parquet, he suggests that the French financial market was 
globally inefficient. We disagree with that interpretation for many reasons. First, the Parquet 
didn’t fail, so that he actually delivered the security that investors waited for. For sure, it had 
to ask for a loan, but the loan was reimbursed very rapidly, proving the only problem the 
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Parquet suffered was one of liquidity, not solvability12. Second, the krach’s effects could not 
be anticipated by the Parquet because they resulted mostly from the abrupt change in 
jurisprudence by the courts concerning forward operations: the courts allowed numerous 
speculators to ask for the “exception de jeu” and so increased the losses of the Parquet by 117 
millions (the amounts corresponding to forward contacts annulled by the courts, including 
those undertaken by the Union générale itself13). Furthermore, speculators on the Coulisse 
imposed important losses to their clients (as shown by the number and results of the 
bankruptcies in the finance industry in the winter of 1882), and the government can be 
considered as responsible for not having tried to control the risks that were taken in the 
finance industry14.  
So we can argue that the 1882 krach does not prove the inefficiency of the Parquet. The value 
of the agents’ offices didn’t decrease substantially after the krach, suggesting new buyers 
didn’t think the future earnings were much affected. Nevertheless, the krach didn’t either 
reinforce the position of the Parquet vis-à-vis the Coulisse. The confidence of contemporaries 
may have been damaged by the difficulties faced by the Parquet in 1882. Actually, the 
Coulisse was able to use the new law legalizing unions to organize more formally in 1884.  
We will argue here that the main reason for the continuing decline of the Parquet in the 1880s 
compared to the Coulisse is neither the dynamic behaviour of the Coulisse nor the inherent 
deficiencies of the Parquet’s organization, nor the Parquet increasing conservatism (as argued 
by Verley15). More important is the internal conflict that affects the CAC concerning the 
solidarity among agents when facing crises.  
Following the 1882 crisis, the long standing (since 1861) head of the CAC (syndic), Moreau, 
was criticized for his management of the crisis, and especially for imposing the solidarity of 
all agents for the reimbursement of the 80 millions loan. Actually, he had been in that 
occasion perfectly consistent with the policy he had been pursuing for 20 years, which had 
                                                 
12 E. White argues that the security provided by the Parquet was indeed limited because the guarantees given by 
the agents de change had decreased compared to the transaction volumes. Nevertheless, he neglects to include 
the personal wealth of the agents, which was the main guarantee of these operations, and which explains the 
rapidity of the loan reimbursement. 
13 The courts argued the forward contracts of the Union générale were not “serious” (the CAC argued that all the 
market was lending to the Union, a bank with 150 millions of capital). The Coulisse was also affected by the 
krach, but maybe comparatively less, first because its forward contracts were less generally considered as secure, 
and also because it had claims on the Union générale (corresponding to the last share issue of the bank) the 
coulissiers unilaterally (as argued by the CAC) compensated with their losses 
14 The government several times refused to legalize the forward markets before 1882, considering the risk that 
the courts recognized the “exception de jeu” imposed some restraint on speculative behaviours. Actually, it only 
created more uncertainty.  
15 Verley (2007) considers that for example the increasingly long tenure of the agents in their charge, and their 
increasingly familial transmission are proofs of a conservative rentier attitude that explains a declining 
entrepreneurial behaviour. 
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permitted the CAC to protect investors for any losses in all crises except in the Leperche 
bankruptcy of 1868. The opposition to Moreau, which had constantly emphasized the moral 
hazard dimension of his policy16, convinced the CAC general meeting not to follow Moreau 
and the Chambre syndicale. Instead of the long period of reimbursement that they proposed, 
which imposed a long standing solidarity among the agents, the general meeting imposed a 
rapid reimbursement schedule, and made clear that the 1882 bailout was the last one. 
Following that decision, Moreau resigned from the Chambre syndicale. In the next few years, 
the CAC was more reluctant in paying for its members’ problems, and tougher in its 
negotiations with banks, which had to accept their share of the losses (Vuaflart case in 1886). 
In the Bex case, in 1888, it refused to pay anything beyond the debts related to the spot 
operations, and let the agent go bankrupt.  
Our view is that this policy change may have been rational from the point of view of some 
agents for whom the solidaristic behaviour was costly, but that overall it led to a decline of 
the Parquet, since the security resulting from that solidarity was one of his major competitive 
advantages vis-à-vis the Coulisse. This new policy, which led to increased competition and 
decreased cooperation within the CAC, was finally rejected in 1892 when Hart, the syndic 
who had succeeded Moreau, was removed, and the solidarity among agents was 
reemphasized.  
During Hart’s tenure, the market share of the Coulisse had kept increasing. The legalization in 
1885 of forward operations was good news for the market as a whole since it ended a long 
standing uncertainty; it benefited mostly the Coulisse since, except for the 1882 crisis, the 
Parquet had obtained a favourable jurisprudence much earlier.  
One question is why, in spite of much lobbying and arguing by free-markets economists, the 
government did not put an end to the Parquet’s monopoly. To the contrary, he homologated 
(and then legal standing to) the Parquet’s internal rules in 1890. The main reason was 
probably the desire to influence the market and control it; for example, in 1892, the 
government imposed the Parquet to develop the “second list” of medium sized firms, 
something he could not do with the Coulisse. Nevertheless, the importance of the Coulisse 
appeared with the creation of a tax on stock market operations in 1893: in spite of the absence 
of legal standing of Coulisse operations, they obtained complete fiscal status, meaning in fact 
the legal recognition of their validity. 
                                                 
16  See e.g. PV AG CAC 28/7/1882. 
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That orientation changed in 1896, mostly because of the “gold mines krach”. During the 
previous years, the Coulisse had listed a great number of new gold mines operating in the 
recently colonized Transvaal, which the parquet could not list. The Boers war led to a sharp 
drop in their prices early in 1896, and to the failure of a high number of investors and 
coulissiers. This gave the Parquet a reason to argue that the Coulisse did not provide the 
security required by a well-functioning market, and to ask for a re-enforcement of its 
privileges. This, added to nationalistic attacks against the Coulisse, which had many foreign – 
and, worse, mostly German – members, led to the 1898 Fleury-Ravarin law which imposed 
the coulissiers to use the intermediation of the agents de change, unifying the market, at least 
in theory, or, in practice, giving the Parquet the right to choose the securities it wanted to 
trade, and to impose its monopoly on these transactions. Even at that moment, the Parquet did 
not want to suppress the Coulisse, but only to control and dominate it, and it took care of 
obtaining a law reserving it the right to sue the Coulisse (and not allowing the Coulisse other 
clients to do it).  
The Coulisse reorganized then in two organizations (syndicats), respectively for spot and 
forward operations (the second one being by far the most important). They developed 
organizational structures much more hierarchical than previously, inspired by the Parquet, and 
they kept realizing a substantial proportion of the transactions. Nevertheless, their market 
share was reduced from almost two-thirds of the  tax on stock market operations (created in 
1893) to around one third.  
The Coulisse becoming more Parquet-like, a new free market appeared in the early 20th 
century, in order to allow for the flexibility and freedom that was disappearing from the 
Coulisse. Although this market remained quite limited (as far as we know, which is not 
much), its existence is perfectly understandable within our multi-polar framework. 
 
Another main challenge the Parquet faced during that period was the development of the role 
of joint-stock banks in securities issues and trading. Earlier, the Parquet already had had to 
adapt to the banks competition by proposing similar services, like the payment of coupons in 
1880. But it seems that then, except for major issues like those of government or railroads 
which required consortiums of banks, most IPOs were organized directly on the stock-
exchange and via the agents de change (and the help of market makers). Especially after 1890, 
when the market developed again, the big banks started using their network to sell directly to 
individual investors the securities which issue they accepted to guarantee. On the secondary 
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market, they sometimes matched directly buy and sell orders from their clients, avoiding the 
Parquet intermediation.  
The CAC protested and rapidly reacted against these practices. On the secondary market, they 
had to accept the “par contre” in 1895, an agreement by which a bank paid commissions only 
on the larger of two matching orders passed in the same day; they also had to accept 
“remises”, that is they transferred part of their commissions to the banks that gave them 
orders (see AG CAC 1910 for protests for the increasing level of the remises). On the primary 
market, where no monopoly existed, the Parquet organized in the mid-1890s in order to be 
able to be part of the most important issues as a group. In 1894, the CAC general meeting 
considered this participation as an “important innovation (…) [that would help to] increase the 
reputation of our Company and (…) help it to rise from the negligible situation bankers want 
to impose it” (AG CAC 17/12/1894). After a few years, the CAC situation was well 
established in issue consortiums and it obtained conditions similar to those of the biggest 
banks (AG CAC 19/12/1904). This shows that the Parquet was not living on monopoly rents, 
but had to innovate in order to maintain its position. Nevertheless, its action was not 
sufficient. The main problem was that the banks direct selling methods in their network killed 
the secondary market: individual investors didn’t modify much their portfolios, and only 
added to it some new securities every year. This was very different from the London situation 
where issues were organized by brokers and were held by speculators making frequent 
operations for a long period before they were sold to their “definitive” holders (Les grands 
marchés, 1912). This may explain a more dynamic forward market in London and the 
complaints by the agents de change against the banks practice (AG CAC 21/12/1908). This 
may also explain the stability and more limited volatility of the Paris market during the gold 
standard period (ibid).  
 
Many changes affect the market during that last period: after a period of development and 
even domination of the Coulisse allied to the big banks, the Parquet developed competitive 
responses and was able to regain part of its position. In any case, this does not look like a 
comfortable monopoly situation. Actually, in 1910, some major participants in the Parquet 
examine the opportunity of creating a new broad, private and less regulated market on the 
London model. At the same moment, London brokers discussed the creation of a new market 
without jobbers because they suffered the strong position of the jobbers resulting from the 
1907 suppression of the dual capacity. They ended up fixing minimum commissions, which 
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suggests that some convergence was taking place and the Paris organization was not 
considered as inefficient even by the London brokers.  
 
III. Evaluating the efficiency of the Parquet : transaction costs, risk, liquidity, volatility. 
 
This section aims at evaluating the efficiency of the Paris stock market. Unfortunately, good 
data for the Coulisse is difficult to find, largely because of its unofficial status and limited 
formal organization up to the end of the 19th c. We then concentrate on the official market. 
Contrary to White (2007), we will argue that the organization of the Parquet actually allowed 
a decrease of both idiosyncratic and systemic risk. We propose to observe first transaction 
costs, then risk, and ultimately liquidity as the three major indicators of efficiency. 
 
1. Transaction costs 
Measuring transaction costs is complex. The most simple of these costs are brokerage 
commissions. Others result from the delays in payments, which involve the loss of interests. 
In the absence of jobbers, the Paris market provides no bid-ask spreads, the indicator of 
transaction costs used by Davis & Neal (2006) and Pagano & Roell (1996). Official brokerage 
fees were initially fixed at ¼% by a decision of the Paris Tribunal de Commerce17 from 
Messidor 26th, an IX (15th of July, 1801), but this level, which did not change for a long time, 
was widely considered as an upward limit. During most of the century, the CAC tried to 
define and enforce minimum commissions. The argument, still used today in economic 
theory, was that predatory pricing could make the intermediaries fragile and create systemic 
risk because of the externalities among them. Nevertheless, enforcement measures were 
always weak. 
One must then try to deduct actual brokerage commissions from both changes in official 
tariffs and debates in the CAC general meetings that give insights on the distance between the 
rules and the practice. The main problem is that commissions varied very much not only 
through time, but also with the operations, the securities and the people involved.  
One example is the 1836s period of speculation on (frequently unlisted) new firms’ shares. In 
their general meetings, the official brokers defined two categories of shares supporting 
                                                 
17  Contrary to the “monopoly” view of the Parquet, up to 1890 commissions were not fixed by the CAC but by 
the Paris commercial court, which had no reason to maximize the agents’ profits (see the conflicts on the 
forward market legal status, for example). These were maximum commissions. Minimum commissions could be 
fixed by the CAC, but they had no legal value, in particular their violation was not sufficient for the CAC to 
expel an agent.  
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respectively 1/8th and 1/4er of a percent as commission. The category paying the lowest fee 
included a large majority of all shares traded, but their number varied during the following 
years under the influence of circumstances (and sometimes the pressure of interested bankers, 
heads of the listed companies18, the government, etc). It seems that the low commission 
became the norm at that moment, but maybe not in the bear market that followed.  
For widely traded securities and good clients, the minimum fee became as soon as 1842 the 
standard fee, even when representing no more than 0.1%, well below the officially agreed 
0.25% minimum.  
Official commissions were not respected by the agents de change, at least if one considers the 
number of cases when the Chambre syndicale complained to the agents about the necessity of 
respecting their own rules. In the late 19th c., the Chambre syndicale tried to created rules for 
the retrocession of commissions to remisiers, bankers or even private clients. It accepted 
rapidly 33% rebates, and even sometimes 50% and up to 80% in some cases.   
A major consideration for fixing the commissions was the volume of trade involved. After the 
1866 crisis, the Chambre syndicale obtained a reintroduction of the bi-monthly settlement, 
arguing a lesser risk (see below). Since this was supposed to bring more business (those 
investors wanting to settle their position after one month would have to pay a reporting fee 
after two weeks), it accepted to reduce the commissions for the securities involved, a loss that 
should be compensated by the increase in business. Government securities (including foreign 
governments) benefited from special commissions, and even sometimes of fixed commissions 
(benefiting major investors) (in the 1890s). After 1871, official commissions were very 
detailed and changed frequently.  
Commissions were negotiated by intermediaries, coulissiers, remisiers and bankers. As we 
mentioned above, a 1895 agreement recognized the strong position of deposit banks, creating 
the « par contre ». 
Furthermore, the government constantly pressured the CAC for decreasing its commissions. 
The 1898 reorganization which reinforced the agents de change monopoly also imposed them 
a substantial reduction in commissions and authorized commission retrocession almost 
without limit.  
Graph 1 proposes a summary of the main changes of commissions on the Parquet, neglecting 
the qualitative changes we just emphasized and which concur to significantly lower 
commissions, at least for the major investors. The main conclusion is that the courtages were 
                                                 
18 In 1838 (CS 2/5) Baron Rothshild required Mines de la Grande Combe to be included, arguing it also included 
a railways company and most railways were in the low-cost category. 
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very low: from the 1830s on, they didn’t exceed 0.125% on most securities, 0.05% on the 
rentes. On the most important forward market, the maximum rate was 0.1% as early as the 
late 1860s, and a proportion of this was transferred to the coulissiers, the bankers or the 
remisiers. After 1898, even spot operations on standard securities paid no more than 0.1%, 
and the normal price on the forward market was 0.05%, and 0.025% for the rentes. Some 
options did not pay any commissions, the CAC considering they were necessary to the 
development of the market (cf. AG CAC 16/5/1902). All these prices were below those 
practiced in London as far as we can deduct them, something confirmed by contemporaries. 
Actually, after the 1898 reform, the agents feared that the remisiers left Paris for London 
because of the low level of commissions in Paris, which made it impossible for the agents to 
transfer them a sufficient profit (cf. AG CAC 23/6/1910). In spite of this, competition was 
harsh among London brokers, and was considered responsible for the 1907 crisis, at least 
enough for the LSE to impose minimum commissions based on that argument. 
Transaction costs should also include delays in delivery and payment, which also increase the 
risk for booth the investors and the intermediaries. Considering the rules applied at the end of 
the 19th century, the Parquet would compare favourably on that account with most  European 
markets in the early 1990s (Pagano & Roell, 1992).  
 
2. Risk 
Investors in financial markets accept a number of different risks. One is the transaction risk 
we just mentioned, resulting from the delay in security delivery or in payment after a 
transaction. Another risk results from the volatility of prices A third one is the systemic risk 
which would materialize if the entire stock exchange would go bankrupt. The three risks are 
not entirely independent but we can analyse them separately. We will argue that the Parquet 
organization decreased significantly all these risks. 
 
Transaction risk 
If one party in a transaction goes illiquid or bankrupt before delivering a security or paying 
for it, the other party risks a loss. The same is true if the broker goes bankrupt. For pure spot 
operations, these risks can be reduced by an adequate organization of the stock exchange, 
matching payment and delivery. It is more delicate for transactions with payment at 
settlement date or for futures contracts. There are two ways to decrease that risk: a good 
screening of the market participants, and the provision of guarantees. The CAC always argued 
its organization allowed a better screening of clients, and indeed asked the agents to provide 
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lists of “bad clients” (sometimes in coordination with the Bank of France) (see e.g. AG CAC 
13/12/1832 and 28/12/1866). Above that screening, the CAC provided better guarantees to 
investors.  
A key question is then the type of guarantees that are provided. Parisian agents de change 
were legally responsible for the operations they executed for their clients within the 
framework of their monopoly. Losses incurred by an agent when executing such an operation 
was considered as “faits de charge”, and the security it had placed with the government, the 
value of its charge and ultimately all its assets could be seized to pay for his debts. 
Furthermore, the CAC considered it was morally responsible for their payment even if it 
always denied any legal responsibility until it was imposed to it in 1898. As we have seen in 
the chronological presentation, the main changes on that respect before 1898 were the 
creation of the Fonds commun in 1818 and the change in 1830 in the internal rules concerning 
its use in order to help agents in trouble. The doctrine of the Chambre syndicale was to first 
help covering the faits de charge, then to help those agents which were victims of a “crise de 
place” (a systemic crisis), then those victims of the bankruptcy or of the bad faith (especially 
those refusing to honour forward contract claiming for “exception de jeu”) of their debtors 
(but in that case the agents was considered having failed in his duty of vigilance), and 
ultimately those having violated the usual practices of the CAC. In the last two cases, the 
agents were required to send in their resignation before any help was given, thus limiting 
moral hazard issues. Loans were given under strict conditions of accounts verification, 
guarantees and interests payments, and only on a short term basis19. All this suggest that the 
conditions for an efficient collective guarantee were present. A first empirical argument, 
provided in graph 2, is the sharp decrease of the number of agents going bankrupt (the slopes 
of the lines in the graph), first after 1818, second after 1830 (much before it became 
impossible with the 1898 legal solidarity). The fact bankruptcies almost disappeared when 
forced resignations occurred at a relatively stable pace suggests the organization allowed the 
CAC to strengthen its reputation by assuming collectively most of the losses incurred and 
preventing, and, a condition for this to work, allowed the CAC to prevent even the risk-lovers 
among its members from taking uncontrollable risks that it would have been unable to 
assume. The decrease in the number of “crises” (here defined as crises sufficiently serious for 
the Chambre syndicale to have to ask the authorization of the general meeting) solved without 
                                                 
19  From 1867 on, the statutes of the CAC imposed the CS to inform the general assembly within 6 months of the 
loans if full reimbursement had not been made before. It likely formalized a former practice. 
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even having to expel the agents recurring to CAC loans also suggests that risk-taking was 
mostly under control. 
Clearly, a precise measure of the losses finally supported by the clients of the illiquid agents 
would be useful. It has been impossible to gather systematic data on that account up to now20. 
The debts for “faits de charge” were systematically paid for from 1832 on. Earlier on, 
definitive losses suffered by clients on that account represented a total of only 0.315 for the 
period from 1818 to 1831, to be compared to 0.667 million for a single bankruptcy in 1817 
(Pillot)21. 
 
Systemic crisis 
The response of the Parquet to systemic crises is also quite efficient. The 1830 crisis, which 
resulted from the revolution, helped the Chambre syndicale obtaining from the general 
meeting the right to intervene more rapidly and freely, and to strengthen the CAC as an 
organization. The next revolution, in 1848, proves the Chambre was able to use efficiently 
these powers since not only there was no bankruptcy, but not even a single forced resignation 
or even a crisis mentioned to the general meeting. The same was true in 1870 in spite of the 
war and the Commune.  
The 1882 krach proved that the Parquet organization didn’t impede speculation in the worst 
sense; but is also a perfect example of the security provided by the CAC organization to 
individual investors. As many as 14 agents suffered some liquidity problem on the month of 
the krach, but six reimbursed the loans from the Fonds commun within the month, and among 
the others no one filed for bankruptcy, and only six were forced to resign by the Chambre 
syndicale. The public suffered no losses, and the solidity of the CAC was such that it was able 
to reimburse all the loan it had obtained from the Bank of France within a short time. This 
confirms that even major crises could only affect the liquidity of the CAC, but not its 
solvency, making operations on the Parquet very safe for any individual investor. 
 
                                                 
20 It is very difficult because, as for any bankruptcy, the proceedings can take years, and the accounts and 
minutes at the CAC mostly measure its own losses. For example, in the 1830-31 crisis, the Fonds commun lent 
up to 3.7 millions to six agents. At the end of 1831, they still owed it 2.25 millions. In order to avoid bankruptcy, 
the Chambre syndicale decided to abandon 0.98 million of this amount to the agents other creditors. Later on, it 
recognized another loss of 0.45 million resulting from bad debts received from one of the agents.   
21 Contrasting with that, in 1822, the Sahut case was solved without bankruptcy, the agents abandoning almost 
0.3 million of their assets on him.  
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Settlement period 
It has been argued that the interval between two settlements (liquidations in French) affects 
transaction risk, the longer the interval the larger the positions accumulated, the potential 
fluctuations and then the risks taken. On the other hand, more frequent settlements involved 
costs, and then commissions covering them; they also involved, like in New-York, the daily 
availability of enormous quantities of cash, when the Paris or London settlements allowed 
most transactions to cancel and reduced the need of cash payments. The minutes of the CAC 
general meetings when the choice between monthly and bi-monthly settlements was under 
discussion (in 1844 the bi-monthly settlement was established, a monthly one was imposed in 
1859 by the government, before a partial reestablishment of the bi-monthly one in 1866) show 
that the agents preferred more profitable bi-monthly settlements and argued it was less risky 
for the market (e.g. PV AG CAC 9/7/1866). We don’t consider this will make much 
difference with the London monthly settlement. 
 
Volatility 
Another risk is the volatility of prices, which creates an uncertainty on the price at which one 
will be able to buy or sale a security. It is to a large extent at the origin of transaction risk 
since few speculators would be unable to pay or deliver without substantial variations in 
prices. We have no data on volatility in the very short run, the major determinant of such risk, 
for the 19th c.. If medium term volatility on stock indices is a good proxy, available data 
suggest it was much lower in Paris than in London. The volatility of Arbulu’s (1998) index of 
spot prices decreased significantly during the century (graph 3) suggesting the market’s 
organization was able to limit the extent of price volatility, especially from the 1850s. Some 
episodes show that the CAC was able to suspend quotations when a crisis started, as in the 
1904 crisis. A comparison of Arbulu’s and London’s “NBER-Bankers magazine” index 
suggest volatility was double in London compared to Paris for the period 1887-1913 (22.3 
compared to 11.2%).  
 
3. Liquidity 
The measure of transaction volumes and then liquidity on the Parquet is not straightforward, 
although various quantitative indicators are available in the archives. A first proxy  are the 
volumes traded; a measure of traded volumes is provided by the timbre, a stamp duty levied 
from 1818 on the brokerage commissions of each agent in order to finance the fonds commun. 
The timbre is supposed to represent 10% of the commissions (after a doubling in 1822), but 
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the minutes of the CAC meetings show it was not so stable: it was raised in 1882 after the 
crisis in order to refill the fonds commun, as had been previously the case in 1848. The timbre 
could also differ among securities. In 1846, a hot debate divided the agents among those 
wanting to suppress the reduced rate for railways shares and those considering it had to be 
maintained. The actual rate of the timbre depended on the precise way the intermediation was 
organized. When remisiers obtained a share in the brokerage commission (to distinguish from 
an independent payment), the timbre ended up representing more than 10% (up to 25% 
following agent Perdrigeon, AG CAC 9/5/1870)/ More importantly, the timbre varied with the 
commissions actually cashed in by the agents, not with the volume traded, so that a decrease 
in commissions reflects in the timbre payments. Despite these limitations, the timbre provides 
interesting insights on the long term evolution of transactions on the Parquet (graph 4). It 
shows the vigorous surge in transactions in the middle of the century, before the competition 
from the Coulisse became so important; the following decline in the timbre resulted both from 
that competition and from the decrease in commissions. 
 
The timbre was the only quantitative measure of the activity of the Parquet as a whole up to 
1870. From 1871 on, the creation of a new settlement system provides a complete measure of 
all spot transactions. For forward operations, the same source provides only the volume of 
actually delivered securities, a small fraction of the total but maybe a correct proxy for its 
evolution since the compensation method (compensation both among clients and agents for a 
settlement period) does not change until World War One. Both series are provided on graph 5, 
although no direct comparison of the relative importance of spot and forward categories either 
as concerns the Parquet traded volumes or its profits can be deducted from these data. 
Forward market transactions measured in that way are also given disaggregated in four 
categories : French and foreign government debts, French and foreign other securities. Graphs 
6 and 7 provide these data. A clear result is that the French rente was almost not traded 
anymore on the Parquet on the eve of World War One, the “Coulisse des rentes” being its 
almost only market in spite of the legal monopoly of the Parquet. Transactions on foreign 
government debts were the only one little affected by the 1882 krach; they grew up to the late 
19th century, and then decreased under the competition of other securities, mostly shares 
which benefited from the long bull market of the Belle Epoque. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Parquet, which was the centre of the Paris stock exchange in the 19th century, was not the 
inefficient monopoly many (sometimes interested) observers argued. It was a structured 
organization which minimized transactions costs thanks to very efficient settlement and 
compensation procedures and maximized the security of transactions thanks to collective 
guarantee procedures that took into consideration moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. Intermediation commissions, which are supposed to be high in a monopoly, were 
actually low. The history of the exchange shows that these qualities resulted from a permanent 
interaction between the government, the Compagnie des agents de change and its 
competitors, bankers and coulissiers. During much of the period, the relationship between the 
various intermediaries was one of both cooperation and competition, involving a substantial 
specialization of each group. Nevertheless, some periods of conflicts had a deep impact, 
leading to attempts by the Parquet at absorbing the Coulisse, or by the Coulisse at suppressing 
all the Parquet’s formal structure. In its dual form, the Paris stock exchange allowed for an 
enormous increase in listings, flotations and transactions that made it the second-biggest 
exchange in the world. 
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Graph 1 : commissions 
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
18
09
18
14
18
19
18
24
18
29
18
34
18
39
18
44
18
49
18
54
18
59
18
64
18
69
18
74
18
79
18
84
18
89
18
94
18
99
19
04
19
09
maximum commission, spot transactions "minimum" commission, spot transactions
commission on rentes spot transactions maximum commissions, forward transactions
"usual" commissions, forward transactions
 
 
Graph 2 : agents de change failures 
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Number of agents de change suffering : bankruptcy (faillites), forced resignation or crises (with help 
from the Fonds commun). The first series take into account all cases discussed in the Chambre 
syndicale (up to 1830), the second ones only the cases debated in the general meeting of the CAC. 
From 1830 on, there was an increased number of crises for which no debate in the general meeting 
was necessary (because of the increased power of the Chambre syndicale, see text). 
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Graph 3 : volatility on the Parquet 
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Volatility of the Parquet index reconstructed by Arbulu (1998). Volatility is measured by standard 
deviation / mean. All major crises appear : 1815 (restauration), 1823, 1830 (revolution), 1848 
(revolution), 1853, 1870 (war), 1882.  
 
Graph 4: Transaction volumes measured by the timbres. 
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The timbre represented usually 10% of the commissions. 
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Graph 5 : Measures of spot and forward transactions 
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Graph 6 Government debts traded, forward market 
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French rentes Foreign dovernment debts
 
Government debts are measured in “francs de rentes”, i.e. in francs of coupons to be paid. If the 
French 3% rente price was at par, 3 million of transactions corresponds to a face and market value of 
100 millions. As previously, these data correspond only to forward operations actually delivered at 
settlement date. 
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Graph 7 Other securities traded, forward market 
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Other french securities Other foreign securities
 
Other securities are measured in number of securities traded. Average security price was probably 
around 500 francs during the period, so 1 million of transactions corresponds to 500 millions francs at 
market value. As previously, these data correspond only to forward operations actually delivered at 
settlement date. 
 
  
 
